

MAYORS *and* **URBAN SCHOOLS:**

Governance Redesign for a New Century

**Presentation to Los Angeles Commission
October 20, 2005**

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NEW ERA OF ACCOUNTABILITY

- Mayors are increasingly held accountable for school system performance
- “Mayor Daley and I share a very important philosophy. Neither one of us is willing to wash our hands of public education. We refuse to let our schools fall by the wayside and join the chorus of politicians saying the failure of the schools isn't their fault. **No, Mayor Daley and I believe that when it comes to educating our kids, the buck stops in the mayor's office.**” – Mayor Menino ¹

NOTES: 1. Quoted in: Brown, Mike. 1996. “Boston: Daley, Menino Say Mayors Key to Better Public Schools,” Press Release, The United States Conference of Mayors.

MAYORS AND SCHOOLS IN CONTEXT

- ✦ Historically, an **older style** of mayoral involvement emphasized:
 - Patronage politics
 - Lack of performance accountability
 - Private regarding goods (such as jobs and contracts)
- ✦ Today, a **new style** of mayoral involvement emphasizes:
 - Primary focus on performance-driven accountability and quality of life citywide
 - Alignment of electoral incentives with school performance
 - Fiscal discipline
 - Implementation of innovative ideas
 - Coordination of education and municipal services

MAYORS AND SCHOOLS IN CONTEXT

- ✦ **In large, urban districts mayoral-appointed school boards are gaining prominence**
- ✦ **Years of decentralized reform alone have not produced system-wide improvement in student performance**
- ✦ **Decisions made at the school site are constrained by collective bargaining agreements, federal and state mandates, and the labor market**
- ✦ **Decentralization may widen the gap between schools with access to external capital and those with limited support**

VARIATIONS OF MAYORAL CONTROL

District	New / Old Style	Mayor appoints <u>majority</u> of board?	Mayor appoints <u>all</u> of board?	Mayor has <u>full appt. power</u> ?
Boston	New	Yes	Yes	Yes
Chicago	New	Yes	Yes	Yes
New Haven	New	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baltimore	New	No: Joint appt. with governor		
Providence	New	Yes	Yes	No ^
Detroit ^a	New	Yes	No *	Yes
Cleveland	New	Yes	Yes	No ^^
Wash. DC ^b	New	No	No	No ^^
Oakland	New	No	No	Yes
Philadelphia	New	No: Joint appt. with governor		
New York	New	Yes	No	Yes

NOTES: a) In 2004, Detroit reverted to an elected school board. b) In 2004, DC reverted to an elected school board. ^ School Board Nominating Commission selects the slate of candidate the mayor can choose from. ^^ Nominating committee pre-screens candidates and then gives a slate to the mayor. ^^ Council confirmation was required when this policy was in place (2000-2004). * State places 1 of 7 on board for first five years.

NEW STYLE OF GOVERNANCE

✦ **Mayoral Control Enhances “Integrated Governance”**

- ✦ **Enables the mayor to rely on system-wide standards to hold schools and student accountable for their performance. Failing schools and students are subject to sanctions while being given additional support (Wong 2001).**
- ✦ **Builds capacity to reduce institutional fragmentation that often impedes strategic improvement.**
- ✦ **Leverages external and intergovernmental resources**

GOALS OF MAYORAL CONTROL

✦ **Mayoral control of urban school systems aims at performance improvement in several areas:**

- 1) Student Achievement**
- 2) Management & Governance, e.g. financial & organizational operations**
- 3) Human capital, e.g. a broader pool of district and school leadership**
- 4) Public confidence, e.g. public opinion and awareness about the school district**

DESIGN OF MAYORAL CONTROL

- ✦ **State and local lawmakers can design mayoral control in order to best meet local conditions**
- ✦ **Defining design features:**
 - ✦ **Transfer of district authority to the mayor's office**
 - ✦ **Moving from elected to appointed school boards**
 - ✦ **Mayoral selection of the chief executive officer, city hall oversight of budget, and/or management operations**
- ✦ **Types of mayoral control include:**
 - ✦ **Mayoral appointment of the entire board (Chicago and Boston)**
 - ✦ **Mayor/Governor shared appointive authority (Philadelphia)**
 - ✦ **Hybrid elected / appointed boards (Washington DC and Detroit, both recently return to elected boards)**

DESIGN OF MAYORAL CONTROL

✦ Lawmakers can consider a number of **design features** and write them into the law:

- ✦ Start Date / Trigger
- ✦ End Date / Repeal
- ✦ Target on Specific District
- ✦ Size of Board
- ✦ Fully mayoral appointed?
- ✦ Jointly appointed?
- ✦ Nominating committee?
- ✦ Oversight committee?
- ✦ Performance goals?
- ✦ Additional legislative guidance?

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

- ✦ A legal **enabling process** is required in order to implement mayoral control
- ✦ Three common approaches:
 - ✦ State legislation that grants direct authority to the mayor to replace an elected board with an appointed board (such as Chicago)
 - ✦ State legislation that grants temporary authority to the mayor, but calls for a citywide referendum on whether to grant the mayor permanent authority to appoint the school board (such as Boston and Cleveland).
 - ✦ Voter approval of changes in a city charter that allow the mayor to appoint school board members (such as Oakland)

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

State	Target	Start	End	Board Size	Details
Illinois	Cities having a population exceeding 500,000 [Chicago]	1995	Requires new legislation	5	Mayor is given direct statutory authority to appoint the board
Ohio	Municipal school district = "is or has ever been under a federal court order requiring supervision and operational, fiscal, and personnel management ..."	"Whenever...released by a federal court from an order requiring supervision and operational, fiscal, and personnel management ..."	Referendum to be held 4 years later; if No, then back to elected board; if Yes, then need new legislation to end appointed board	9	Slate of at least eighteen candidates nominated by a municipal school district nominating panel is given to Mayor; Mayor then appoints 9 school board members
Maryland	Baltimore City directly	1997	Requires new legislation	9	Jointly appointed by the Mayor of Baltimore City and MD Governor from list of qualified individuals submitted by the State Board
Massachusetts	Boston directly	1991	Referendum passed in 1996; Now requires new legislation **	7	Mayor is given direct statutory authority to appoint the board

State	Target	Start	End	Board Size	Details
Michigan	School districts with 100,000 + students (§ 380.371)	“Not later than 30 days after the date the qualifying school district becomes a school district of the first class” (§ 380.372 (1))	Referendum to be held 5 years later; if No, then back to elected board; if Yes, then need new legislation to end appointed board (§ 380.410)	7	Mayor appoints 6, and for first 5 years, 7 th spot filled by Michigan Superintendent of Public Instruction
New York	New York City directly	2002	2009	13	Mayor appoints 7; 5 Borough presidents each select 1; Plus Chancellor
Oakland	City charter	2000	2004	10	Mayor appts. 3 of 10
Pennsylvania	Districts on the “Educational Empowerment” List ^ ... population in excess of forty-five thousand (45,000)” and “a history of extraordinarily low test performance”	14 days after certification as fourteen (14) days of the certification of school district as education empowerment district	Later of: 5 years or “ ... no longer has a history of low test performance and has reached the goals set forth in the school district improvement plan”	5	Mayor is given direct statutory authority to appoint the board
D. C. [2005 on]	Washington D.C. directly	2004 (July 8)	Requires new legislation	—	Election by ward
D.C. [up to 2004]	Washington D.C. directly	2000	2004 (July 7)	9	Mayor appoints 4, must be approved by Council; 5 others are elected

CHICAGO REFORM

- ✦ In 1995, the Illinois state legislature enacted the Chicago School Reform Amendatory Act.
- ✦ The Act reversed the trend towards the decentralization of school operations and, instead, moved towards integrating authority at the system-wide level. The major institutional features of Integrated Governance include:
 - ✦ Mayoral appointment of a 5-member school board and selection of the chief executive officer;
 - ✦ Elimination of competing sources of authority, such as the School Board Nominating Commission and the School Finance Authority; teachers' right to strike not allowed for 18 months
 - ✦ Powers granted to the school board to hold Local School Councils (LSC) accountable to system-wide standards;
 - ✦ Creation of the position of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) that oversees the top administrative team, including the Chief Education Officer.

CHICAGO REFORM

✦ Improved Fiscal Management

- ✦ Improved capital funding, balanced the budget, and secured labor stability through a four-year contract with the teachers' union.
- ✦ School board launched the first capital improvement plan in decades to address the deterioration of the schools' physical plant.
- ✦ Improved management efficiency by waging a public battle against waste and corruption, downsizing the central office and contracting out several operations.

✦ Gained support of the public and business community

- ✦ The district's management improvements garnered the support of the business community and improved public confidence in the school system.

CHICAGO REFORM

✦ **Balancing Pressure and Support**

- ✦ **District initiatives, such as school probation and academic promotion policy, utilize formal sanctions to pressure schools and students to improve performance on standardized tests**
- ✦ **Other initiatives provide failing schools with additional resources and foster principal and teacher discretion in program designs and hiring**

BOSTON & CLEVELAND

- ✦ **Voter referendum provides another process through which mayors are given the authority to appoint the school board.**
- ✦ **This strategy – letting the people vote on changing the nature of the school board – has proven effective in two major cities:**
 - ✦ **Boston in both 1992 and 1996**
 - ✦ **Cleveland in November 2002**
- ✦ **In both cases, the voters supported the continuation of mayoral control of the school district, allowing the mayor to appoint members to the school board.**
 - ✦ **Support from the business community in Boston**
 - ✦ **Bi-partisan and business support for Mayor White in Cleveland**

BOSTON & CLEVELAND

- ✦ **Boston's "Education Mayor" has received strong business and community support. While teachers union initially opposed the move to mayoral control, it has come around to support Mayor Menino. Among the mayor's first accomplishments was a five-year contract with the teachers union.**
- ✦ **There was strong bi-partisan and business support for Mayor White in Cleveland. With the support of the Cleveland business community, the "Advisory Committee on Governance" of the Cleveland Summit on Education proposed a bill in 1997 that gave control of the district to the mayor. The legislature granted the mayor control of the public schools in 1998.**

OAKLAND

- ✦ **Oakland illustrates the challenges of “mixed” appointed / elected boards.**
- ✦ **In March 2000, Oakland voters approved a change in the city’s charter, allowing the mayor (Jerry Brown) to appoint three school board members. Since the governing board of the Oakland Unified School District has 10 members, however, Mayor Brown did not gain majority control.**
- ✦ **Facing strong institutional resistance, Mayor Brown has had difficulty in implementing any large scale management changes in the school system. Mayor Brown’s strategy has been to “put people on the school board who push the superintendent.”**

RESEARCH ON OUTCOMES

✦ What do we know about the effects of mayoral control on:

✦ Student achievement

✦ Fiscal responsibility

✦ Management

✦ Public opinion

NARROWING THE GAP

- ⊕ By reallocating resources district-wide, mayors can effectively reduce achievement gap within the district
- ⊕ **DATA:** We use school level data from the National Longitudinal School-Level State Assessment Score Database, for years 1999-2003.
- ⊕ We examine a key measure of achievement gap:
 - ⊕ **75 / 25 Ratio.** This is defined as the ratio of achievement levels of the 75th percentile (i.e. 75% of schools have lower achievement scores) and the 25th percentile. The lower the 75/25 Ratio, the smaller the achievement gap.

Comparison of 75 / 25 Ratios in Mayoral Control Cities, 1999 – 2003

Elementary READING	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Boston (Gr. 3)	-	-	1.9	1.91	1.78
Boston (Gr. 4)	3.67	5.5	1.87	2.54	2.85
Boston (Gr. 7)	-	-	1.92	1.57	1.79
Chicago (Gr. 3)	2.42	2.35	2.12	2.15	2.18
Chicago (Gr. 5)	1.78	2.05	1.92	2.03	1.93
Cleveland (Gr. 4)	1.82	2.15	1.87	2.17	1.54
Cleveland (Gr. 6)	2.07	2	3.09	3.06	1.52
NYC (Gr. 4)	2.18	1.95	1.92	1.75	1.67
Elementary MATH	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Boston (Gr. 4)	2.86	3.67	4.5	4.6	4.17
Boston (Gr. 6)	-	-	2.3	2.44	2.4
Boston (Gr. 8)	5.5	5.5	3	4.4	3.5
Chicago (Gr. 3)	2.19	2.39	2.03	2.12	1.93
Chicago (Gr. 5)	2.29	2.63	2.35	2.62	2.06
Cleveland (Gr. 4)	1.87	2.35	2.3	2.5	1.96
Cleveland (Gr. 6)	2.76	3.15	2.66	3.25	2.07
NYC (Gr. 4)	1.83	1.98	1.81	1.74	1.41

STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

✦ National, cross-district Regression Analysis

- ✦ Sample of all school districts in nation that: (1) are not a component of a supervisory union, (2) primarily serve a central city of a Metropolitan Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA), (3) have at least 40 schools, (4) receive at least 75% of their students from a principal city, and (5) send at least 75% of their city's public school students to the same school district.
- ✦ Using “**z-scores**” to allow for comparison across district. The z-score is a measurement of “standard deviations from the mean.” A z-score of +1 means that the observation is one standard deviation above the mean. A z-score of -1 means that the observation is one standard deviation below the mean.
- ✦ Including in each model the previous year's standardized achievement.
- ✦ Also accounting in model for: previous year achievement level, poverty level, district size, minority population, per-pupil expenditures, single-member/at-large school board

STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

- ✦ **Modeling mayoral control.** Based on the four dimensions of institutional variation in mayoral control districts, we develop a four-point index:
 - ✦ **“NEW STYLE”**: Is the governance structure driven by a “new style” of mayoral control? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
 - ✦ **“MAJORITY”**: Does the mayor have power to appoint the majority of the board members? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
 - ✦ **“ALL”**: Does the mayor have the power to appoint all board members? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
 - ✦ **“FULL”**: Does the mayor have full power to appoint board members without having them screened beforehand, approved afterwards, or jointly appointed? (1 = Yes, 0 = No)
 - ✦ **“INDEX”**: Composite “Mayoral Control Index” (sum of four factors above)

- ✦ We run regression analysis using each of these indicators to see which aspects of mayoral control are related to student achievement.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

- ✦ **Results presented here are from pooled (1999-2003, over 100 districts) OLS regression analysis, clustered on school district (producing robust standard errors).**
- ✦ **Dependent variables: Standardized (z-scores), reading and math, 1999-2003**
- ✦ **Unit of observation: the “district-year”**
- ✦ **Using the following control variables:**
 - ✦ **Prev. Math/Read: The standardized (z-score) achievement measure of the school district in the previous year.**
 - ✦ **Mayoral Control: One of the five measures mentioned previously.**
 - ✦ **Mayor Council Govt.: Dummy variable = 1 if city is governed by a mayor-council form of government, 0 if not**
 - ✦ **Enroll: Number of students enrolled in K-12 in the district**
 - ✦ **% Hispanic: Percentage of total school membership that is Hispanic, non-white**
 - ✦ **% Afr.Am.: Percentage of total school membership that is African American**
 - ✦ **% Private School: Percentage of children in the city, ages 5-17, who are enrolled in a private school**
 - ✦ **% Poverty: Percentage of children living within school district boundaries who are living below the poverty line**
 - ✦ **% Local Rev: Percent of all school district revenue that comes from local sources**

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: READING

	New Style	Majority	All	Full	Composite Index
Prev. Read	0.9191	0.9172	0.9171	0.9183	0.9181
(Std. Err.)	0.0200	0.0199	0.0199	0.0201	0.0199
Mayoral Control	0.0450	0.0597	<i>0.0800</i>	0.0170	<i>0.0177</i>
(Std. Err.)	0.0335	0.0406	0.0438	0.0270	0.0108
Mayor Council Govt.	<i>-0.0391</i>	<i>-0.0399</i>	<i>-0.0405</i>	<i>-0.0371</i>	<i>-0.0401</i>
(Std. Err.)	0.0202	0.0202	0.0203	0.0206	0.0203
Enroll	2.04E-08	2.04E-08	3.51E-08	2.77E-08	2.16E-08
(Std. Err.)	3.76E-08	3.79E-08	3.8E-08	3.4E-08	3.82E-08
% Hispanic	-0.0678	-0.0649	-0.0680	-0.0648	-0.0696
(Std. Err.)	0.0842	0.0847	0.0854	0.0845	0.0844
% Black	<u>-0.1422</u>	<u>-0.1441</u>	<u>-0.1398</u>	<u>-0.1384</u>	<u>-0.1430</u>
(Std. Err.)	0.0615	0.0605	0.0592	0.0611	0.0604
% Private School	-0.2792	-0.2634	-0.2955	-0.2539	-0.2823
(Std. Err.)	0.2305	0.2314	0.2293	0.2269	0.2304
% Poverty	<u>-0.5067</u>	<u>-0.5406</u>	<u>-0.5659</u>	<u>-0.4936</u>	<u>-0.5304</u>
(Std. Err.)	0.2063	0.2127	0.2148	0.2104	0.2105
% Local Rev	-0.0559	-0.0641	-0.0741	-0.0590	-0.0643
(Std. Err.)	0.0582	0.0593	0.0573	0.0591	0.0581
R^2	0.9429	0.943	0.9431	0.9428	0.943

Notes:

Signif.

Bold, 14pt

= p < .01

Italics

= p < .1

Underline

= p < .05

Dep.

Variable is:

z-score for district in given year (1999-2003)

N for all models: 451

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS: MATH

	New Style	Majority	All	Full	Composite Index
Prev. Math	0.9133	0.9115	0.9117	0.9134	0.9127
(Std. Err.)	0.0212	0.0211	0.0211	0.0212	0.0211
Mayoral Control	0.0405	<i>0.0684</i>	<i>0.0836</i>	<i>0.0490</i>	<u>0.0204</u>
(Std. Err.)	0.0311	0.0397	0.0427	0.0247	0.0102
Mayor Council Govt.	<i>-0.0364</i>	<i>-0.0379</i>	<i>-0.0381</i>	<i>-0.0359</i>	<i>-0.0382</i>
(Std. Err.)	0.0218	0.0217	0.0218	0.0219	0.0218
Enroll	1.44E-08	1.14E-08	2.77E-08	1.53E-08	1.31E-08
(Std. Err.)	3.47E-08	3.65E-08	3.75E-08	3.15E-08	3.68E-08
% Hispanic	-0.1000	-0.0978	-0.1006	-0.1022	-0.1031
(Std. Err.)	0.0844	0.0850	0.0855	0.0835	0.0850
% Black	<i>-0.1357</i>	<u><i>-0.1394</i></u>	<i>-0.1340</i>	<i>-0.1339</i>	<i>-0.1377</i>
(Std. Err.)	0.0759	0.0745	0.0737	0.0749	0.0745
% Private School	-0.4082	<i>-0.3955</i>	<i>-0.4271</i>	<i>-0.3964</i>	<i>-0.4181</i>
(Std. Err.)	0.2199	0.2215	0.2211	0.2182	0.2209
% Poverty	<u><i>-0.4244</i></u>	<u><i>-0.4643</i></u>	<u><i>-0.4857</i></u>	<u><i>-0.4139</i></u>	<u><i>-0.4538</i></u>
(Std. Err.)	0.1843	0.1884	0.1884	0.1856	0.1867
% Local Rev	0.0180	0.0088	-0.0012	0.0116	0.0084
(Std. Err.)	0.0629	0.0623	0.0621	0.0634	0.0618
R ²	0.9331	0.9333	0.9334	0.9331	0.9333

Notes:

Signif.

Bold, 14pt

= p < .01

Italics

= p < .1

Underline

= p < .05

Dep.

Variable is:

z-score for district in given year (1999-2003)

N for all

models: 451

RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

- ✦ **Governance structures that stop short of full mayoral control may not be as effective in raising student achievement**
 - ✦ For both reading and math, the Composite Index of Mayoral Control (measuring the cumulative effect of multiple provisions) was positively associated with student achievement
 - ✦ Whether or not a mayor appoints *all* of the school board is significantly and positively related to student achievement, but simply appointing a majority is not linked to higher reading achievement
- ✦ **Mayor-Council cities by themselves are not enough.**
 - ✦ There is a significant, inverse relationship between mayor-council forms of government and student achievement.
- ✦ **Private school market is a significant factor for cities**
 - ✦ In our analysis of math achievement, the greater the proportion of city children enrolled in private schools, the lower math achievement.
- ✦ **Structural challenges remain**
 - ✦ The percentage of city children living in poverty is consistently inversely related to student achievement
 - ✦ The percentage of African-American students in the district is strongly, inversely related to achievement
 - ✦ Mayors are in a strong position to coordinate city services that can address these challenging issues

RESEARCH ON OUTCOMES

✦ What do we know about the effects of mayoral control on:

✦ Student achievement

✦ **Fiscal responsibility**

✦ Management

✦ Public opinion

FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT

- ✦ **Within the first couple of years, mayoral appointed boards seem able to show financial solvency, often turning a deficit into a balanced budget.**
- ✦ **Mayoral control systems are also able to raise the bond rating, maintain labor peace, improve client satisfaction, and improve efficiency at the central office.**
- ✦ **In Chicago, for example, the Standard & Poor's raised the district's bond rating from BBB- to A- during the first two reform years.**
- ✦ **In Philadelphia, the board identified \$44 million of waste and launched a \$1.5 billion capital plan to build new schools and modernize facilities.**

RESEARCH ON OUTCOMES

✦ What do we know about the effects of mayoral control on:

✦ Student achievement

✦ Fiscal responsibility

✦ **Management**

✦ Public opinion

MANAGEMENT REFORM

- ✦ **Mayoral control systems tend to consolidate the central office bureaucracy. In New York, for example, 40 district offices are streamlined into 10 instructional divisions, each led by a regional superintendent. New “learning support centers” are spread out strategically across the city to provide more direct client-oriented services to schools, parents, students, and teachers.**
- ✦ **Mayoral selected CEOs often broaden the pool of expertise in operation, finance, and management. Our analysis of the first three years of Chicago’s reform showed that more than 40% of the managerial appointees came from outside the school system.**
- ✦ **There is, of course, the longer term challenge of changing the governing culture in a multilayered organization. Although top management may be integrated, the middle and lower strata of district operations may remain insulated from city hall and the changes the mayor wishes to bring about. Thus, an incentive structure on performance-based accountability needs to be in place.**
- ✦ **In Philadelphia, for example, 40 of the lowest performing schools are outsourced with Educational Management Organizations (EMOs).**

RESEARCH ON OUTCOMES

✦ **What do we know about the effects of mayoral control on:**

✦ **Student achievement**

✦ **Fiscal responsibility**

✦ **Resource management**

✦ **Public opinion**

DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY

- ✦ **In 2004, Detroit voters chose to end the mayoral appointed school board after poor district performance under mayor's leadership**
- ✦ **In 2002, Cleveland voters chose to continue mayoral control after strong performance**
- ✦ **Lesson: voters can discern school performance, and will hold mayor accountable**

FACTORS FOR SUCCESS

- ✦ **While districts vary in their reform effectiveness, the components for success in mayoral appointed boards include the following factors:**
 - ✦ **Establishing clear and attainable strategic goals**
 - ✦ **Mayor's willingness to put financial and political resources to leveling up failing schools**
 - ✦ **Working together with the existing administration for a smooth transition**
 - ✦ **Recruit managers who bring diverse expertise**
 - ✦ **Making the administrative heads as well as the principals, teachers and students accountable for results.**